For weeks, Nigerians have protested outside the National Assembly over proposed amendments to the Electoral Act 2022. At the centre of this controversy is a technical but crucial question: how should election results be transmitted from polling units to collation centres? The answer to this question will determine the credibility of Nigeria’s 2027 general elections and potentially every election thereafter.

The Current Legal Framework

The Electoral Act 2022 governs how elections are conducted in Nigeria, but its provisions on result transmission are notably vague. Section 60(5) of the Act states that “the presiding officer shall transfer the results including total number of accredited voters and the results of the ballot in a manner as prescribed by the Commission.” This language gives the Independent National Electoral Commission complete discretion over how results move from polling units to collation centres.

The law uses the word “transfer” rather than any specific method of transmission. It makes no mention of electronic systems, the internet, or INEC’s Result Viewing Portal known as IReV. Most significantly, it leaves the entire process to INEC’s operational guidelines rather than creating statutory requirements. Section 50(2) reinforces this discretion by stating that “voting at an election and transmission of results under this Act shall be in accordance with the procedure determined by the Commission.”

During the 2023 general elections, INEC deployed electronic transmission technology and uploaded many polling unit results to the IReV portal. Citizens could watch results appear in real time on their phones. But when disputes arose and cases reached the Supreme Court, justices ruled that electronic transmission was unknown to law. Because the Electoral Act did not mandate electronic transmission, INEC had discretion to use it or not, and courts could not compel the commission to rely on electronically transmitted results over manual paper forms.

This created a fundamental problem. Nigeria had invested in technology and raised citizens’ expectations about transparency, but the legal framework made electronic transmission optional rather than mandatory. The law permitted INEC to use modern methods but did not require it, leaving electoral outcomes vulnerable to the same manipulation tactics that had plagued Nigerian democracy for decades.

The Proposed Reform

After the 2023 elections exposed these gaps, the National Assembly Committees on Electoral Matters examined the issue and recommended amendments. The committees’ initial proposal for a new Section 60(3) contained three key elements: mandatory electronic transmission of results, explicit reference to the IREV portal, and a requirement for real-time upload whilst witnesses remained present at polling units.

This proposal represented a fundamental shift from discretionary to mandatory electronic transmission. The phrase “shall electronically transmit” made it obligatory rather than optional. The specific mention of “IREV portal” identified the exact platform by name in the statute. Most critically, the inclusion of “in real time” required immediate upload whilst witnesses remained present at the polling unit, before anyone could alter results during transportation to collation centres.

Under this proposal, presiding officers would have had no choice about whether to use electronic transmission. They would have been legally required to upload results immediately after counting and signing forms. The narrow window for compliance would have closed whilst polling agents, party representatives, and citizens were still present to verify that uploaded results matched what had been announced. This real-time requirement was the key provision that would have transformed Nigerian elections by eliminating the opportunity for result manipulation between polling units and collation centres.

What the Senate Actually Adopted

When the Electoral Act Amendment Bill came before the Senate for consideration on 4 February 2026, senators initially rejected the committees’ proposal and voted to retain the existing Section 60(5) language from the 2022 Act. The decision sparked nationwide protests and fierce criticism from civil society organisations. Faced with public outrage, the Senate convened an emergency session on 10 February, and the Senate passed a revised version of Clause 60(3).

The Senate’s adopted provision now reads: “The presiding officer shall electronically transmit the results from each polling unit to the IREV portal and such transmission shall be done after the prescribed Form EC8A has been signed and stamped by the presiding officer and/or countersigned by the candidates or polling agents where available at the polling units. Provided that if the electronic transmission of the results fails as a result of communication failure, the result contained in Form EC8A signed by the presiding officer and/or countersigned by the polling agents shall, in such a case, be the primary source of collation and declaration of results.”

This version makes three critical changes from the committees’ recommendation. First, it removes the phrase “in real time,” meaning presiding officers must electronically transmit results but not necessarily immediately whilst witnesses are present. Second, it creates an exception for “communication failure” without defining what constitutes such failure or what proof is required. Third, it designates manual Form EC8A as “the primary source” when electronic transmission allegedly fails, effectively creating a hierarchy where paper results can override electronic records.

Legal Implications of the Senate’s Position

The removal of “in real time” from the Senate’s version fundamentally weakens the provision’s effectiveness. Without a time requirement, presiding officers can leave polling units with paper forms, and nothing in the law compels them to upload results within any specific timeframe. A presiding officer could theoretically wait hours or even days before transmitting results electronically. During this delay window, opportunities arise for external pressure, bribery, or coercion to alter results before they are uploaded.

The phrase creates ambiguity about when compliance has occurred. If a presiding officer uploads results six hours after counting concluded, has he fulfilled his legal obligation to “electronically transmit” results? Under the Senate’s language, arguably yes, because there’s no temporal requirement. This stands in sharp contrast to the original proposal where “real time” would have required upload within minutes whilst witnesses could verify accuracy.

The communication failure exception presents even more serious legal problems. The provision states that if electronic transmission “fails as a result of communication failure,” manual results become primary, but it nowhere defines what constitutes communication failure. Does it mean complete absence of network coverage? Weak signal strength? Server congestion? Equipment malfunction? Human error in operating devices? Deliberate network sabotage? The statute is silent.

This definitional gap creates significant evidentiary challenges. When disputes arise over whether electronic or manual results should prevail, tribunals will face questions the law doesn’t answer. What standard of proof applies to claims of communication failure? Must presiding officers provide contemporaneous documentation? Are witness statements sufficient? Should independent technical verification be required? Without statutory guidance, different tribunals may apply inconsistent standards, creating legal uncertainty and unpredictability.

The provision also fails to specify who determines whether communication failure occurred. Is it the presiding officer’s subjective assessment at the polling unit? Must the ward collation officer verify the claim? Should INEC’s technical staff investigate? Can collation officers reject claimed failures and demand electronic transmission? The law provides no procedural framework for resolving these questions, leaving critical decisions to individual discretion rather than clear legal standards.

By designating manual Form EC8A as “the primary source” when communication failure is claimed, the Senate’s provision creates a troubling hierarchy between electronic and manual results. This language suggests that paper forms carry greater legal weight than electronic records when technology allegedly fails. But this hierarchy contradicts the entire purpose of electronic transmission, which is to create a tamper-proof record that prevents the kind of result manipulation possible with paper forms.

Consider a scenario where electronic results from IReV show one outcome, but a presiding officer arrives at a collation centre with a manual Form EC8A showing different numbers and claims communication failure prevented upload. Under the Senate’s provision, the manual result is designated as primary. Even if server logs show that partial transmission occurred, or if citizens have photographic evidence of different numbers being announced at the polling unit, the law says the manual form shall be the primary source for collation and declaration.

This provision interacts problematically with existing Section 64 of the Electoral Act, which requires collation officers to verify that votes stated on collated results are consistent with votes recorded and transmitted directly from polling units. If manual results are primary when communication failure is claimed, does this override the collation officer’s duty to verify against electronically transmitted results? The statute creates conflicting obligations without resolving which takes precedence.

The Senate’s version also raises questions about the burden of proof in election petitions. Under current electoral jurisprudence, petitioners challenging election results bear the burden of proving their allegations. When a presiding officer claims communication failure and presents manual results, must the petitioner prove that communication failure did not occur? Proving a negative is notoriously difficult. Without mandatory documentation requirements or technical verification procedures, demonstrating that claimed failures were fabricated becomes nearly impossible.

Comparison with the House of Representatives Version

The House of Representatives passed a different version that retains the “in real time” requirement. The House provision mandates that presiding officers “shall electronically transmit the results from each polling unit to the IREV portal in real time.” This language eliminates the delay window that exists in the Senate version. It requires immediate upload whilst witnesses are present, creating a narrow compliance window that closes before presiding officers can leave polling units.

The House version does not include the Senate’s sweeping communication failure exception. Whilst it presumably recognises that technology can fail, it doesn’t create a blanket provision making manual results primary whenever failure is claimed. This places greater responsibility on INEC to ensure technology works and to provide backup systems, rather than creating an easy escape route from electronic transmission requirements.

The substantive difference between the two versions is this: the House version makes electronic transmission truly mandatory with real-time requirements and limited exceptions, whilst the Senate version makes electronic transmission nominally mandatory but creates significant loopholes through the absence of time requirements and the broad communication failure exception.

The Harmonisation Process

Nigerian legislative procedure requires that when the Senate and House pass different versions of a bill, a conference committee must reconcile the differences. A committee has been established with members from each chamber. This committee will negotiate a unified text that both houses must then approve before the bill can proceed to the president for signature.

The conference committee operates largely behind closed doors, and its deliberations will determine which version prevails or whether some compromise emerges. The committee could adopt the House version with real-time requirements, the Senate version with communication failure exceptions, or craft entirely new language attempting to balance both approaches. Whatever emerges will then face up-or-down votes in both chambers.

From a legal perspective, the harmonisation process represents the critical juncture where statutory language will be finalised. The conference committee’s choices about whether to include “in real time,” how to define communication failure, whether to make manual results primary, and what verification procedures to require will determine whether Nigeria’s Electoral Act provides a robust framework for electronic transmission or a weak framework full of exploitable loopholes.

Implications for Electoral Litigation

The Senate’s current language creates conditions for extensive post-election litigation. If the provision becomes law in its current form, expect election tribunals to be inundated with cases disputing whether communication failures were genuine, whether manual results should override electronic records, and whether collation officers properly verified claimed failures.

These cases will require tribunals to make factual findings about technical matters the statute doesn’t adequately address. Different tribunals may reach different conclusions about similar fact patterns, creating inconsistent jurisprudence. Appellate courts will struggle to provide clear guidance when the underlying statute itself is ambiguous. The result will be prolonged legal uncertainty after close elections, precisely what electoral reform should prevent.

Contrast this with a statute that includes real-time requirements and clear communication failure protocols. Such legislation would reduce litigation by making compliance standards clear and making violations easier to prove. When the law mandates immediate upload and provides specific procedures for documenting genuine technical failures, disputes become more straightforward to resolve. The Senate’s current version achieves the opposite effect.

Conclusion

The controversy over electronic transmission reveals a fundamental tension in Nigerian electoral reform. The country has invested in technology capable of making elections transparent and results verifiable in real time. But technology alone cannot reform elections if the legal framework remains weak. The Senate’s current position represents partial progress by explicitly recognising electronic transmission and naming the IReV portal in statute, but it falls short of creating the robust legal requirements necessary to prevent manipulation.

The critical deficiencies are the absence of “in real time” language, the undefined communication failure exception, and the designation of manual results as primary when technology allegedly fails. These provisions create opportunities for delay, fabrication of technical excuses, and override of electronic records by paper forms. They transform what should be a strong transparency mechanism into a discretionary system vulnerable to abuse.

The legal implications extend beyond the 2027 elections. Whatever language is ultimately adopted will establish precedents for interpreting electronic transmission requirements, allocating burdens of proof in election disputes, and balancing technology with traditional paper-based processes. The choices made now will shape Nigerian electoral law for years to come.

As the conference committee begins its work harmonising the Senate and House versions, the central legal question is whether Nigeria will adopt clear, mandatory, enforceable standards for electronic transmission or settle for ambiguous language that creates the appearance of reform whilst preserving opportunities for manipulation. The answer will determine not just the technical process of result transmission but the fundamental credibility of Nigerian democracy.