Effective Ways to Recover Debts Using the Claims Framework under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of Nigeria

 

Abstract

 

Recognising the transnational nature of maritime operations and the challenges posed by constantly mobile vessels, this Article looks at the legal mechanisms available for debt recovery under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA) and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rules (AJPR) 2023 in Nigeria. It looks at the various maritime claims under Sections 2 and 5 of the AJA, that will likely give rise to actions for recovery of debts such as unpaid charter hire, bunker supply charges, port dues, towage fees, ship repair invoices etc. It also evaluates the enforcement procedures like commencing actions in personam, in rem, or as hybrid claims, noting that an action in rem, accompanied by vessel arrest, remains the most potent tool for securing maritime debts. Procedural rules for commencement, arrest, release, and enforcement under the AJPR were set out, with emphasis on the arrest regime, provision of security, and court-ordered sale of vessels. This article concludes that the AJA and AJPR provide a robust, specialised, and commercially effective framework for maritime debt recovery, enabling creditors to utilise the vessel itself as security and thereby surmount jurisdictional and enforcement challenges.

 

1. Introduction

The maritime sector being international in nature, with vessels moving constantly across jurisdictions, makes recovery of debts and the enforcement of claims complex. However, the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, Cap A5, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (L.F.N.) 2004 (“AJA”)  and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedural Rules (AJPR) 2023 offers a robust statutory framework that provides both substantive and procedural tools for the recovery of debts arising from maritime claims.

I critically examine effective ways to utilise the claims framework under the AJA to recover debts, and the procedure laid down in the AJPR to commence Admiralty proceedings to enforce these claims.

 

2. Maritime Claims for Debt Recovery

The scope of admiralty jurisdiction, as detailed in Section 2 AJA, encompasses a wide scope of maritime claims broadly categorised in 3 claims. They are as follows;

Proprietary Claim – By section 2(2) AJA, a proprietary maritime claim only covers:

1. Claims over a ship’s possession, ownership, or mortgage (including mortgages on freight).
2. Disputes between co-owners about possession, ownership, operation, or earnings.
3. Enforcement of a judgment against a ship or property in an admiralty in rem case.
4. Interest relating to any of the above claims.

 

General Maritime Claim – By section 2(3) AJA, a general maritime claim refers to the following:

(a)  Claim for damage caused by a ship, whether from collision or any other cause.
(b)  Claim for damage suffered by a ship.
(c)  Claim for death or personal injury caused by a defect in the ship or its equipment.
(d)  Claim (including death or injury) caused by an act or omission of:

1. (i) The ship’s owner or charterer,
2. (ii) A person in possession or control of the ship, or

• (iii) Someone for whose wrongful act that owner/charterer/controller is responsible.

(e)  Claim for loss of or damage to cargo carried by the ship.
(f)  Claim under an agreement for carriage of goods/people by ship, or for using or hiring a ship.
(g)  Claim for salvage services, including saving life or recovering cargo/wreck on land.
(h)  Claim relating to general average (shared contribution for losses voluntarily incurred to save the voyage).
(i)  Claim for pilotage fees.
(j)  Claim for towage of a ship or an aircraft while afloat.
(k)  Claim for goods, materials, or services supplied to a ship for its operation/maintenance (e.g., fuel, stevedoring, and lighterage).
(l)  Claim for ship construction, including before launch.
(m)  Claim for ship alteration, repairs, or equipment; also dock charges/dues.
(n)  Claim for port, harbour, canal, or light tolls/charges, or any similar fees related to the ship.
(o)  Claim under a bottomry loan (loan secured on a ship or cargo, repayable on successful voyage).
(p)  Claim by master/shipper/charterer/agent for disbursements made for the ship.
(q)  Claim for unpaid insurance premiums or mutual insurance calls relating to the ship or its cargo.
(r)  Claim by the master or crew for:

1. (i) Wages, or
2. (ii) Any other employment-related sums owed under contract or law.

(s)  Claim for forfeiture/condemnation of a ship or cargo, or for restoration after seizure.
(t)  Claim to enforce, or arising from, an arbitral award (including foreign awards) on a proprietary or general maritime claim.
(u)  Claim for interest on any of the claims in (a)–(t).

 

Maritime Lien – Maritime liens in Nigeria are limited to the four categories in Section 5(3) AJA:

1. Salvage
2. Damage done by a ship
3. Crew wages
4. Master’s disbursements

 

From these categories of maritime claims outlined above, debts in maritime matters typically arise from claims relating to the carriage of goods or passengers by sea, charter party agreements, towage or pilotage services, the supply of goods and services to a ship, mortgage or ownership disputes, and damage caused by or to a ship. Notably, Section 2(3) (f) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act expressly includes claims “in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship for her operation or maintenance,” which represents one of the most common bases for maritime debt recovery actions. Consequently, suppliers of bunkers, spare parts, provisions, and ship chandlers owed sums by ship owners, charterers, or managers may properly frame their claims as maritime claims under the AJA. Similarly, claims for unpaid charter hire, outstanding freight or demurrage, bunker supply debts, port dues or agency fees, and ship repair or maintenance invoices all constitute recoverable maritime debts within the purview of the AJA.

 

 

3. Admiralty Jurisdiction

Section 1 of the AJA vests exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty matters in the Federal High Court. There are 3 forms of Admiralty action. They are as follows;

1. Claims in Personam – By Section 5(1)[i], a claimant can always sue in personam against the owner of the vessel or the company liable. An action in personam lies against the person or entity owing the debt, typically the ship owner or charterer.
2. Claims in Rem – By Section 5(2)[ii], a claimant can maintain an action in rem against the vessel or the res. An action in rem is a very powerful recovery tool as the vessel is arrested as pre Judgment security. It is worthy of note that an action in rem is only allowed for certain proprietary claims and maritime liens. An action in rem may be maintained even if the owner of the ship is not domiciled in Nigeria, provided the ship is within Nigerian territorial waters when the writ is issued. An action in rem allows creditors to secure maritime debts by arresting the debtor’s ship before it sails, ensuring the ship serves as security for the eventual judgment.

• Hybrid Claims – By Section 5(4), other general maritime claims in section 2 can be brought in rem against the Ship itself and in personam against the owner of the vessel or the company liable, provided that the liable person (“relevant person”) was the owner/charterer/in control when the cause arose and is still the beneficial owner of all shares or a demise charterer when the action is filed; or any other ship fully owned by the same relevant person at the time of filing (sister-ship arrest)[iii].

 

The first strategic decision a Claimant must decide is whether to frame the action in personam against the party liable or in rem (against a vessel) or hybrid against the vessel and the relevant person.

 

4. Commencing a Debt Recovery Claim

The Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rules (AJPR) 2023, made pursuant to the AJA, govern the process of debt recovery in Court. By Order 3 Rule 1 AJPR, Admiralty proceedings may be commenced by either a Writ of Summons or an Originating Summons. However, there are specific provisions like Order 3 Rule 3(1) AJPR and Order 3 Rule 4(1) AJPR specifically provides that an admiralty claim in rem and in personam shall be commenced by writ of summons. By virtue of Order 3 Rule 8 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rules (AJPR)[iv], any action not required by the Rules to be commenced by writ of summons shall be commenced by Originating Summons, using Form 5 with such modifications or variations as the circumstances may require.

 

It is also worth noting that by Order 21 Rule 7 AJPR[v] where the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the Lower Court is properly invoked, any procedural defect in the mode of commencement does not nullify the proceedings. The emphasis of the law is on substantial justice, not procedural technicality.

 

Moreover, Order 1 Rule 1(2) AJPR[vi] permits recourse to the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules where the Admiralty Rules are silent or incomplete.

For an action in rem, the claimant must identify the relevant ship or sister ship to which the claim relates. Upon filing, the court may, on an ex parte application, issue a warrant of arrest under Order 7 Rule 1 AJPR, securing the vessel pending determination of the claim. The provision for arrest is one of the most potent debt recovery tools available in maritime law, effectively compelling owners to settle outstanding debts to secure release of their vessel.

Order 9 Rule 6(3) AJPR provides that where a ship or other property has been arrested and the owners thereof have failed to provide bail for the release of same for a period of not less than 60 days from the date of the arrest, the Court may, on the application of the arrestor or other interested party order that the ship or other property be sold by the Admiralty Marshal and the proceeds of sale paid into an interest-yielding fixed deposit account in the name of the Admiralty Marshal pending further orders of the Court.

 

5. Arrest as Security for Debt Recovery

The principle underpinning the action in rem is that the ship itself is treated as the wrongdoer or debtor. The Court may, therefore, order the arrest of the vessel to secure the claim. The Arrest provision has a strong deterrent and settlement effect. Ship owners are usually unwilling to allow their vessels to remain under arrest due to daily losses from demurrage, idle crew costs, and charter cancellations. Consequently, vessel arrest often results in prompt payment or negotiated settlement.

Where the vessel is arrested, the owner may secure its release by providing satisfactory security, often in the form of a bank guarantee or a protection and indemnity (P&I) club letter of undertaking, covering the claimed amount and costs.

The AJA and AJPR thereby create a balance of interests, protecting the claimant’s right to security while ensuring that legitimate ship owners can continue operations upon provision of adequate substitute security.

 

6. Enforcement of Judgment and Settlement

Once judgment is obtained, enforcement proceeds in the usual manner, either by sale of the arrested vessel or by garnishee proceedings against funds in Nigeria. Even though many cases conclude through consensual settlement once, the ship is arrested. Thus, the threat or execution of an arrest serves both as a legal and commercial instrument for effective debt recovery.

 

7. Conclusion

The Admiralty Jurisdiction Act provides a specialised, powerful, and efficient framework for the recovery of maritime debts in Nigeria. By properly classifying claims under the Act, leveraging the action in rem, and promptly obtaining arrest orders, practitioners can ensure that their clients’ maritime debts are secured and recovered effectively. In the Maritime industry, where ships may sail away overnight, speed, precision, and procedural mastery are the lawyer’s most valuable assets. The AJA and the AJPR’s structure ensures that maritime creditors need not chase debtors across borders, as the ship itself, under Nigerian law, stands as security for the debt.

 

[i] Section 5(1) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1991 provides thus; “Subject to section 6 of this Decree, an action in personam may be brought in the Court in all cases within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court”.

[ii] Section 5(2) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1991 provides thus; “In the case of a claim as is mentioned in section 2 (2) (a) or section 2 (3) (u), or a question as is mentioned in section 2 (2) (6) of this Decree, an action in rem may be brought in the Court against the ship or property in connection with which the claim or question arises”.

[iii] Geepee Ind. (Nig.) Ltd. v. The MV Kota Manis (2025) 15 NWLR (Pt. 2007) 143 SC, P. 166, paras. F-G

[iv] Order 3 Rule 8 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction procedure Rules provides thus; “(I) Any action not required by these Rules to be commenced by writ of summons shall be commenced by originating summons and shall be as in Form 5, with such modifications or variations as circumstances may require. (2) an originating summons shall be accompanied by: (a) an affidavit setting out the facts relied upon; (b) copies of all the exhibits to be relied upon; and (c) a written address”.

[v] Order 21 Rule 7(1) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedural Rules provides thus; “Where in beginning or purporting to begin any proceeding or at any stage in the course of or in connection with any proceeding, there has by reason of anything done or left undone, been failure to comply with the requirements of these Rules, whether in respect of time, place, manner, form or content or in any other respect, the failure may be treated as an irregularity and if so treated, will not nullify the proceedings, or any document, judgment or order therein”.

[vi] Order 1 Rule 1(2) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedural Rules provides thus; “The Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules shall apply subject to the provisions of these Rules”.

HOW TO GET A STRESS-FREE DIVORCE IN NIGERIA

 

Divorce Petition is a process I often find difficult to take up on behalf of a client, but where love goes sour, it is inevitable, especially where cruelty and violence pose imminent danger; then, parties must go their separate ways. The Matrimonial Causes Act primarily governs divorce in Nigeria, and a court cannot grant a decree of dissolution of marriage unless it is satisfied that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. The burden lies on the petitioner to prove to the court that one or more of the underlisted statutory grounds exist.

Section 15(2) (a)-(h) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 

1. The Respondent has continuously refused to consummate the marriage;
2. The Respondent has committed adultery, and the Petitioner finds it intolerable to live with him or her. 
3. The Respondent has behaved in a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with him or her. 
4. The Respondent has deserted the Petitioner for at least one year. 
5. The Parties have lived apart for a continuous period of two years. 
6. The Parties have lived apart for a continuous period of three years. 
7. The Respondent has failed to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. 
8. The Petitioner presumes that the Respondent is dead.

Divorce is often portrayed as a strenuous process filled with emotional turmoil, legal battles, and financial strain. However, with appropriate planning, open communication, and the right Legal support, it is possible to navigate it more smoothly and minimise stress. In my practice, I often advise clients to file a non-messy divorce. Most times, messy divorce follows the children of the marriage even after their parents are long divorced, as processes filed in court are public documents that can be obtained by any person, including unaffected third parties. There are many other instances where cases are reported in law reports used by lawyers in their everyday practice of law, alongside law students. Therefore, it is important to completely eliminate conflict and focus on the big issues.

 

These big issues are usually custody of the children of the marriage, sharing of the matrimonial properties and maintenance. In my practice, I see many women refusing to allow their partners access to the children. My advice to them is to allow them in the lives of the children, especially where their partners are willing and able to take up responsibilities. I tell them that there are many instances I see unconcerned and unperturbed fathers running away from their roles and responsibilities. Though the courts can order the father to be responsible for the children, such as payment of school fees, etc, but where they refuse to do so after the judgment, nothing happens to them. Therefore, it is important to allow a willing father. 

 

For the sharing of matrimonial properties, it is important that parties to a marriage endeavour to ensure that their names are fully written in any properties purchased after marriage. This is because no party in a matrimonial proceeding is automatically entitled to an equal share of matrimonial property solely by virtue of marriage, without proving contribution. In Aguolu Aguolu (2025) LPELR-8026 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that “the mere existence of a marriage, even one that endured before a separation of over 22 years, does not entitle a party to an equal share of assets”.  Clearly, before a party to a marriage can take part in the sharing of the matrimonial properties, he or she must show evidence of material contribution to the purchase of the properties.

 

To commence a hassle-free divorce in Nigeria, one that will be amicable and uncontested, where both parties agree on major issues like asset division, child custody, and support. This approach avoids prolonged court battles, saving time, money, and emotional energy. Here are some foundational tips to make the process less stressful:

1. Open Communication

One of the main reasons divorce becomes messy is a lack of communication. When emotions run high, it is easy for small misunderstandings to spiral into major conflicts. Couples who make a conscious effort to communicate clearly about finances, custody, and expectations set a foundation for a smoother process. A divorce process becomes less complicated when both parties communicate clearly and respectfully.

2. Seek Professional Legal Guidance

Engaging a skilled family law Lawyer early in the process is crucial. A lawyer can provide clarity on rights, obligations, and potential outcomes, and guide parties through mediation or court procedures where necessary. Legal advice ensures that proper decisions are made, documents are properly executed, and all statutory requirements are met. The process of obtaining a divorce in Nigeria follows a series of structured legal steps designed to ensure fairness and due process, as captured in the MCA, though obsolete. 

However, parties to a marriage can avoid all these issues by contracting a prenup agreement before the commencement of their marriage. Under section 72(2) of the MCA, every prenup agreement must be fair, have a full disclosure of the assets, be entered into voluntarily, with no coercion.  Below are some of the things I advise my clients when it comes to a prenup agreement;

1. Before parties get married, they should discuss their reasons for entering into the marriage and the need for an agreement when love goes sour. 
2. Parties should assess their finances, especially those from wealthy families. These include assets, liabilities, incomes and other valuables. In fact, all relevant information should be fully disclosed during the prenup.
3. None of the parties should attempt to prepare and execute a prenup agreement without proper legal guidance. Experienced family lawyers can offer appropriate advice on the legal requirements, rights and limitations involved.
4. The terms of a prenup agreement must be jointly determined by both parties. I usually advise that lawyers representing each party provide the necessary legal advice on the appropriate clauses to ensure fair protection of both sides. Such clauses may include an assets and debt clause, a spousal support clause for women, and business ownership protection, among others.

It is important to say that all prenup agreements must comply with the provisions of the MCA. The agreement must include a statement from each party’s lawyer confirming that independent legal advice was provided based on the information disclosed by the parties. It must also be signed by both parties in the presence of at least two witnesses, who must also sign the document. 

In addition, the prenup agreement should be reviewed and revised periodically, preferably every five years. This allows both parties to mutually update the agreement as needed to reflect any changes in their financial circumstances or personal situations.

In conclusion, divorce in Nigeria need not be a catastrophic, protracted fight among parties. With early legal guidance, open communication, and a focus on the children’s welfare, many couples can reach fair, efficient outcomes that minimise emotional and financial damage. Prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, when entered into voluntarily and with full disclosure, can further reduce uncertainty and conflict by providing a clear roadmap for asset division. Ultimately, the most hassle-free divorces are those where both parties prioritise clarity, fairness and the long-term well-being of their children involved, and seek legal guidance early in the process.

The Constitutionality of the Joint Revenue Board: A Challenge to Nigeria’s Fiscal Federalism

Introduction

On June 26, 2025, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed into law four landmark tax reform bills that fundamentally reshape Nigeria’s revenue administration landscape. Among these reforms is the Joint Revenue Board (Establishment) Act, which creates the Joint Revenue Board (JRB) and represents one of the most ambitious attempts to overhaul Nigeria’s fragmented tax system in decades.

Set to take effect on January 1, 2026, the JRB has sparked intense constitutional debate. Legal experts question whether centralizing revenue collection authority under federal oversight is compatible with Nigeria’s federal structure. This article examines the constitutional concerns surrounding the JRB and their implications for fiscal federalism.

The Problems the Reforms Seek to Address

Nigeria’s tax administration has long been plagued by significant challenges. Multiple revenue agencies operate with minimal coordination, creating confusion for taxpayers and opportunities for revenue leakage. Businesses operating across state lines face inconsistent tax rules, duplicate filings, and sometimes, double taxation. States lack standardized systems for tax assessment and collection, resulting in widespread inefficiencies.

The fragmented system has contributed to Nigeria’s chronically low tax-to-GDP ratio, which remains among the lowest globally. Revenue collection is often opaque, with limited accountability mechanisms. Taxpayers have few effective channels for resolving disputes or seeking redress for unfair treatment. These systemic failures have cost Nigeria billions in potential revenue while eroding public trust in tax administration.

The reforms aim to address these issues through comprehensive institutional restructuring and improved coordination across government tiers.

The New Institutional Framework

The JRB replaces the old Joint Tax Board, which was established under the Personal Income Tax Act in 2004 with a purely advisory role focused on personal income tax coordination. The new JRB’s mandate is significantly broader, covering harmonization and coordination of revenue administration across all types of taxes, levies, charges, and revenues at all levels of government.

The JRB’s composition reflects this comprehensive ambition. It includes the Executive Chairman of the Nigeria Revenue Service as Chairman, Chairmen of all State Internal Revenue Services, and representatives from various federal agencies including the Ministry of Finance and the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.

Beyond the JRB itself, the reforms introduce entirely new institutions. Specialized Tax Appeal Tribunals will handle tax disputes, while the Office of the Tax Ombud will advocate for taxpayer rights. This institutional architecture aims to create a unified approach to revenue collection across all tiers of government, bridging coordination gaps in Nigeria’s current system.

Constitutional Concerns: Federal Overreach

Despite these laudable objectives, legal experts have raised serious concerns about potential constitutional breaches. They allege that the powers conferred on the Nigeria Revenue Service violate federalism principles enshrined in the 1999 Constitution.

The constitutional provisions at issue include Sections 7, 62, 81, 121, and 124, Second Schedule Part 1, and Chapters 5, 6, and 7. These sections govern fiscal federalism and establish how revenues are generated, collected, and shared among federal, state, and local governments.

Section 4(1)(a) of the Nigerian Revenue Service Establishment Act 2025 has attracted particular scrutiny. This provision transfers the assessment and collection of income taxes from partnerships, enterprises, and individuals to the Nigeria Revenue Service functions traditionally performed by State Internal Revenue Services.

The practical implications are significant. Taxes generated by businesses operating entirely within a state would now be collected by a federal agency, even where those revenues belong to state governments. States would transform from independent revenue authorities into mere recipients awaiting federal remittance of revenues collected within their jurisdictions.

The Centralization Problem

More troubling to critics is the broader mandate empowering the NRS to collect all revenues, taxes, and levies accruable to federal, state, and local governments. This effectively creates a monopolistic national tax collector with unprecedented reach across all government tiers.

By consolidating virtually all tax collection authority under one federal agency, the federal government gains significant leverage over states and local governments. This arrangement undermines their constitutional status as coordinate not subordinate authorities. States lose not just administrative control but also the autonomy to determine how revenues within their jurisdictions are assessed and collected.

Critics argue this arrangement is fundamentally incompatible with Nigeria’s federalism, which presumes fiscal autonomy. Each tier of government should possess the power to generate, assess, and collect its own revenues. The JRB reforms, they contend, effectively convert Nigeria’s federal structure into a de facto unitary system in practice, even if not in name.

 

Potential Legal Challenges and Precedents

States may contest aspects of the reforms through litigation, though precedents on revenue centralization present a mixed picture.  While courts have historically been reluctant to challenge federal revenue authority as seen in the 2022 Court of Appeal decision in Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) v. Attorney General of Lagos State that affirmed federal control over VAT collection, constitutional principles of fiscal federalism remain judicially protected in other contexts.

The Tax Appeal Tribunal’s 50% deposit requirement for appeals presents another constitutional vulnerability. Legal scholars argue this provision may violate Sections 6(6)(b) and 36(1) of the Constitution, which guarantee access to justice. Requiring taxpayers to deposit half the disputed amount before appealing effectively restricts access to adjudication, particularly for small businesses and individuals.

Beyond constitutional challenges, implementation faces practical obstacles. Nigeria’s intergovernmental relations are often characterized by mistrust and political tensions. States may lack the administrative systems, data infrastructure, or political will to collaborate effectively on the data sharing and policy coordination the JRB requires.

Several states with strong revenue bases particularly Lagos, Rivers, and Kano may be especially resistant to reforms that diminish their fiscal autonomy. These states have invested significantly in building their tax collection capacity and may view the JRB as federal encroachment on hard-won institutional gains.

The Federalism Question

At its core, the debate over the JRB concerns the nature of Nigerian federalism itself. Nigeria’s Constitution establishes a federal system where the federal, state, and local governments are meant to operate as coordinate entities, each with defined revenue sources and collection powers.

This constitutional design reflects a deliberate choice to distribute power across government tiers rather than concentrate it federally. Fiscal autonomy, the ability of each tier to control its own revenue generation and collection, is central to this design. Without fiscal independence, states cannot effectively exercise their constitutional functions or serve as meaningful checks on federal power.

The JRB reforms appear to deepen the centralization trend that has long made Nigeria’s fiscal federalism contentious. Since independence, Nigeria’s federal government has progressively expanded its control over revenue sources, leaving states increasingly dependent on federal allocations. The JRB may represent the culmination of this trend, formalizing federal dominance over virtually all revenue collection.

Proponents might argue that efficiency gains and improved coordination justify some sacrifice of state autonomy. However, critics contend that such efficiency cannot come at the cost of constitutional principles. Federal systems inherently trade some efficiency for accountability, checks and balances, and protection against tyranny. Dismantling these protections in the name of administrative convenience threatens the federal compact itself.

Analysis and Future Implications

The Joint Revenue Board represents a fundamental tension in governance: the desire for administrative efficiency versus the imperative to preserve constitutional structure. While the reforms address real problems in Nigeria’s tax system, they may do so through means that conflict with constitutional design.

If the reforms proceed as enacted, legal challenges are possible though not certain. Some states may mount constitutional challenges, particularly those with strong revenue bases and concerns about federal encroachment on their fiscal autonomy. However, current political realities including states’ unsuccessful litigation over VAT collection may make states more cautious about challenging federal revenue authority in court.

If such litigation occurs, the outcomes will shape Nigerian federalism for decades. If courts uphold the JRB’s broad powers, Nigeria’s federal system may effectively function as a unitary state for revenue purposes. If courts strike down key provisions, the federal government will need to redesign reforms to respect state fiscal autonomy while still achieving coordination goals.

A middle path may be possible. Courts could validate coordination mechanisms while limiting federal collection authority to federal taxes only. This would preserve the JRB’s harmonization role while maintaining each tier’s control over its own revenue sources.

Conclusion

The Joint Revenue Board reforms reflect a laudable ambition to modernize Nigeria’s tax administration and address long-standing coordination failures. However, they risk undermining the principles of fiscal federalism that are central to Nigeria’s constitutional framework.

As Nigeria navigates the tension between administrative efficiency and federal autonomy, the path forward requires careful constitutional crafting. Reforms must strengthen coordination without consolidating all collection authority federally. States need support in building capacity, not dispossession of their constitutional powers.

The coming year will prove decisive. By early 2026, affected states will likely have initiated constitutional action. By mid-2026, lower courts may issue preliminary rulings. The Supreme Court’s eventual decision—possibly arriving in 2027 or beyond—will determine whether Nigeria can achieve efficient tax administration while preserving genuine fiscal federalism, or whether the federal structure will continue its drift towards centralization.

The stakes extend beyond tax policy. How Nigeria resolves this tension will signal whether its federal system can adapt to modern governance challenges while remaining true to constitutional principles, or whether federalism will continue as constitutional fiction masking unitary reality.

References

1. Andersen Tax. “President Tinubu Signs 2025 Tax Reform Acts into Law; New Regime to Take Effect from January 2026.” Available at: https://ng.andersen.com/president-tinubu-signs-2025-tax-reform-acts-into-law-new-regime-to-take-effect-from-january-2026/
2. Afriwise. “Tax Administration in Nigeria – A Review of the 2025 Nigerian Tax Reform Laws.” Available at: https://www.afriwise.com/blog/tax-administration-in-nigeria—a-review-of-the-2025-nigerian-tax-reform-laws
3. MyTax. “How Nigeria Joint Revenue Board (JRB) Different Joint Tax Board (JTB).” Available at: https://mytax.com.ng/blog/how-nigeria-joint-revenue-board-jrb-different-joint-tax-board-jtb
4. 1st Attorneys. “The Nigerian 2025 Tax Reform Acts: Legal Review and Implications for Stakeholders.” June 28, 2025. Available at: https://1stattorneys.com/articles/2025/06/28/the-nigerian-2025-tax-reform-acts-legal-review-and-implications-for-stakeholders/
5. Punch Newspapers. “Tax Reform: Centralised Collection Undermines Federalism.” Available at: https://punchng.com/tax-reform-centralised-collection-undermines-federalism/
6. Forum of Federations. “Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Unsettled Issues.” Available at: https://www.forumfed.org/document/fiscal-federalism-in-nigeria-unsettled-issues/
7. Premium Times. “Bridging the Gaps in Policies and Implementation: Nigeria’s New Tax Laws” by Bolutife Oluwadele. Available at: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/807722-bridging-the-gaps-in-policies-ands-implementation-nigerias-new-tax-laws-by-bolutife-oluwadele.html

 

 Balancing Expertise, Opportunity and Global Representation in Sports Arbitration 

 

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) recently released an analysis of its arbitrator appointments from 2022, and the results are striking. Around 20% of arbitrators handle roughly 60% of all cases, and the vast majority of these individuals are European. For an institution that serves the global sporting community, this concentration raises serious questions about fairness, legitimacy, and long-term sustainability. 

First and foremost, it is important to acknowledge why repeat appointments occur. Parties naturally gravitate towards arbitrators with a proven track record, those familiar with CAS procedure and capable of delivering consistent, high-quality outcomes. Repeat nominations are not inherently problematic; consistency and reliability are essential in arbitration.

The challenge, however, is that the expertise requirement can be a double-edged sword and can serve as both a requirement and a barrier. To be appointed, arbitrators need experience. This goes without saying, but experience comes from appointments. This creates a repeat cycle in which talented arbitrators from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East rarely get the chance to build the experience necessary to be considered for future appointments. The result is a global institution that does not promote inclusiveness. 

At the same time, the principle of party autonomy must be respected. Parties must continue to have the freedom to choose arbitrators they trust. In a bid to respect party autonomy, systemic imbalance should not be entrenched. CAS has an opportunity to ensure that appointments are distributed more equitably while preserving the integrity and expertise parties expect.

One practical avenue to address this imbalance is the responsible use of technology to reduce bias and over-concentration. Decision-support tools can provide transparency, track appointment patterns, and highlight highly qualified but underutilised arbitrators. These tools can help maintain consistency while making room for emerging talents from underrepresented regions. Importantly, they do not replace human judgment or party choice; they support it, providing a clearer picture of available expertise and helping to ensure that merit, not geography, drives appointments.

Achieving this balance also requires structured mentorship and observation programmes, broader participation pathways, and careful monitoring of workload concentration. Parties should have access to more complete information about arbitrators, increasing confidence in selecting less familiar, yet highly qualified candidates.

There is an irony worthy of note in this discourse. One of CAS’s co-founding figures, H.E. Judge Keba Mbaye, is a Senegalese national. Despite being African, representation from the continent remains disproportionately low. If CAS is to maintain its credibility and authority as the global court of sports, it must address these imbalances.

It is evident that consistency and experience matter, but so do sustainability, opportunity, diversity, and fairness. CAS has the chance to lead by example, ensuring that the pool of arbitrators reflects the breadth and diversity of the sporting world itself. Expertise must be allowed to grow across all regions, not just one.

The future of CAS depends on striking this balance: respecting party autonomy while fostering a system that is inclusive, representative, and capable of sustaining expertise for generations to come. A truly global institution must reflect the world it serves — in practice, not just in principle.

 

Policy Recommendations

1. Establish an AI‑Assisted Appointment Framework
   • Create a pilot decision-support system that maps arbitrator competencies, tracks appointment patterns, and suggests under-rotated arbitrators.

   • Ensure the logic is transparent, auditable, and periodically reviewed by a diverse committee, including arbitrators, parties, and experts.

2. Enhance Transparency of the Closed Arbitrator List
   • Publicly disclose selection criteria for the CAS arbitrator roster, including how ICAS considers diversity (continental representation, legal culture, language skills).

   • Periodically report on appointment distribution by geography, gender, race/ethnicity, and concentration metrics.

3. Create a Structured Mentorship and Experience‑Building Programme
   • Develop a “CAS Emerging Arbitrators Programme” where new arbitrators can shadow, assist, or co-chair less complex tribunals.

   • Pair experienced arbitrators with emerging ones to facilitate skill transfer and accelerate experience-building.

4. Safeguard Party Autonomy While Promoting Diversity
   • Provide parties with enhanced, transparent arbitrator profiles to encourage confidence in selecting qualified but less familiar candidates.

   • For CAS-appointed roles (e.g. sole arbitrator, tribunal president), mandate a balance of merit, diversity, and equitable distribution.

5. Institutionalise Participatory Review and Continuous Improvement
   • Form a Diversity & Innovation Advisory Committee within ICAS to oversee reforms.

   • Regularly audit appointments, monitor diversity and concentration, and adjust policies based on outcomes.

References

Broyde, M. & Mei, Y., 2024. Don’t Kill the Baby: The Case for AI in Arbitration. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.11608 [Accessed 17 November 2025].

Clyde & Co., 2024. Sports Arbitration: The Court of Arbitration for Sport. Available at: https://www.clydeco.com/en/insights/2024/05/sports-arbitration-the-court-of-arbitration-for-sp [Accessed 17 November 2025].

De’Shazer, M., 2024. Advancing Legal Reasoning: The Integration of AI … with Semi-Automated Arbitration Processes (SAAPs). Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.04140 [Accessed 17 November 2025].

Kleinberg, J., Mullainathan, S. & Sunstein, C., 2019. Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.03731 [Accessed 17 November 2025].

Morgan Sports Law, 2024. Arbitrator Diversity at the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Available at: https://morgansl.com/en/latest/arbitrator-diversity-court-arbitration-sport-part-two [Accessed 17 November 2025].

Zhang, A., et al., 2023. Deliberating with AI: Improving Decision‑Making … through Participatory AI Design. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.11623 [Accessed 17 November 2025].

ICAS, 2024. Internal Rules on Arbitrator Appointment and Diversity. Oxford: Academic. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/arbitration/advance-article/doi/10.1093/arbint/aiae054/8105852 [Accessed 17 November 2025].

How Should Boards Handle Corporate Governance Crises? Lessons from Paystack on Crisis Response and Prevention

 

How Organisations Must Respond When Leadership Fails the Trust Test

The recent allegations surrounding Ezra Olubi, co-founder of Paystack, have thrust into the public arena a pertinent question that will give governance professionals something serious to ponder on: what happens when those entrusted as corporate guardians and stewards within an organisation become the source of an ethical crisis? 

The Paystack situation is not an isolated incident but rather indicative of a widespread governance gap across the African corporate landscape. When a board member, particularly a founder with significant equity and societal influence, faces credible allegations of misconduct, the very structures designed to ensure accountability are put to their ultimate test.

 

The Nigerian Regulatory Framework: 

Nigeria’s body of codified corporate governance guidelines has evolved significantly over the past two decades. The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) guidelines and the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018 (NCCG 2018) establishes in Part A Principle 1 that the board and its members must act “with utmost good faith, in the best interest of the shareholders and other stakeholders while sustaining the prosperity of the Company.” It further states in Principle 1.7 that the board and its members must “establish and maintain the Company’s values and standards (including an ethical culture) as well as model these values and standards;”

 

Section 305 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2020 crystallises directors’ fiduciary duties, requiring them to “act in good faith and in what the director believes to be in the best interests of the company.” 

Particularly, subsection 4 of Section 305 of the CAMA provides “A director shall act at all times in what he believes to be the best interests of the company as a whole so as to preserve its assets, further its business, and promote the purposes for which it was formed,…”

When misconduct allegations emerge, these duties transform from abstract principles into concrete action imperatives.

The expectation of having a fiduciary duty to an organisation requires placing organisational interests far above personal relationships, founder mystique, or fear of reputational damage to Nigeria’s burgeoning tech ecosystem.

It was very encouraging to see how Paystack reacted speedily as the news broke on social media with the announcement that its CTO Ezra Olubi was suspended and relieved temporarily from his duties, this would not be surprising given the heavy scrutiny and spotlight the founders and company have been under ever since it became a unicorn. However the reality is quite different for thousands of other companies that are far from the spotlight. In such situations, where the pressure is not high, implementation may falter precisely because boards often fail to prepare for such scenarios. The African Development Bank’s Report on Corporate Governance in Africa (2021) emphasises that “effective governance frameworks must extend beyond paper compliance to practical accountability mechanisms, particularly regarding senior leadership conduct.”

 

The Anatomy of Institutional Failure

In my experience reviewing post-crisis governance failures across African jurisdictions, certain patterns emerge with disturbing regularity;

Founder Immunity Syndrome: Organisations often operate under an unspoken assumption that founders exist in a separate category from other employees. This cognitive bias is particularly pronounced in Africa’s relatively young technology sector, where founders are celebrated as nation-builders and job creators. The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance warns against this “leadership exceptionalism,” noting that it undermines the very systems designed to prevent abuse.

Mind your Optics: When allegations surface, the critical first 72 hours often determine whether an organisation will navigate the crisis competently or compound the harm through mismanagement. Nigerian companies that lack pre-established investigation protocols invariably stumble, creating secondary victims through institutional negligence.

Misguided Course of Action: Boards sometimes engage in misguided cost-benefit analyses, weighing the “value” of retaining a talented but allegedly abusive leader against the “cost” of their departure. This framework is fundamentally flawed. As the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance argues in its Principles for Corporate Governance in Africa (2020), such calculations fail to account for the corrosive effect of tolerating misconduct on organisational culture, employee morale, and long-term sustainability.

 

Independence Is Non-Negotiable

When serious allegations emerge, the board’s first responsibility should be to initiate an independent investigation. Note the emphasis on “independent”,this exercise cannot be an internal review led by those with personal or professional ties to the board and must be outsourced to competent firms or companies.

Principle 19 of NCCG 2018 mandates that Nigerian companies establish “effective frameworks for whistleblowing mechanisms” and “so that action can be taken to verify the allegation and apply appropriate sanctions or take remedial action to correct any harm done.” Best practices require immediate engagement of external counsel with specific expertise in workplace investigations and Nigerian employment law; formation of a special board committee composed entirely of independent directors with no personal ties to the accused; clear terms of reference defining the investigation’s scope, methodology, and timeline consistent with Nigerian legal requirements; interim measures to protect potential victims and prevent retaliation or evidence destruction; and transparent communication protocols balancing the need for confidentiality with stakeholder accountability.

 

Nigerian Case Law: Accountability Cannot Be Selective

Nigerian courts have increasingly held directors accountable for governance failures. The Superior  Courts have affirmed in a plethora of cases that directors owe fiduciary duties to the company itself, not just to dominant shareholders or fellow directors. This principle becomes critical in misconduct cases where personal loyalties may conflict with institutional obligations.

More instructively, in Haston (Nig.) Ltd. v. A.C.B. Plc (2002) FWLR (pt. 119) 1476 at 1492, the Supreme Court emphasised that fiduciary duties require “the highest standard of honesty, openness, and probity.” Sexual misconduct allegations against a director clearly trigger this heightened scrutiny.

Section 288 of CAMA 2020 provides that directors may be removed by ordinary resolution of shareholders. However, waiting for shareholder action whilst misconduct allegations remain unaddressed violates the board’s duty of care. The board itself must act swiftly, utilising its authority under the company’s articles of association and employment contracts.

 

Founder Dynamics: Equity vs Ethics

The Paystack situation highlights a particularly thorny governance challenge prevalent in African startups: what happens when the alleged wrongdoer holds significant equity and potentially contractual protections?

Nigerian venture capital investors have increasingly insisted on governance provisions that specifically address founder misconduct. The African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (AVCA) Corporate Governance Guidelines (2019) recommend good leaver/bad leaver clauses that distinguish between voluntary departures and terminations for cause; conduct-based dilution provisions that reduce equity stakes following substantiated misconduct findings; independent director majorities that can act without founder approval on sensitive matters; and explicit definition of “cause” that includes sexual harassment and misconduct.

 

The Cultural Dimension: Beyond Compliance to Prevention

Whilst crisis management response and escalation protocols are essential, the more modern and proactive approach is crisis prevention. The African Corporate Governance Network  (emphasises that African organisations must develop governance cultures firmly rooted in both international best practices and contextual understanding of local and cultural workplace dynamics.

Psychological safety is paramount. Organisations where employees feel safe reporting concerns without fear of retaliation experience earlier detection and resolution of ethical issues. This is particularly challenging in hierarchical African corporate cultures and in founder-led startups where power dynamics are pronounced. Boards must actively measure and reinforce this safety.

The NCCG 2018 states that “the board should provide entrepreneurial leadership within a framework of prudent and effective controls, which enables risk to be assessed and managed.” Ethical culture flows from leadership behaviour. When board members model accountability, including holding themselves to the same standards as others, the entire organisation benefits.

 

Transparency and Stakeholder Communication

One of the most fraught governance questions in misconduct cases is: what do we tell stakeholders, and when?

The NCCG 2018 requires that companies “disclose all material matters, including matters that have the potential to affect the performance and sustainability of the company.” Sexual misconduct allegations against a co-founder clearly meet this materiality threshold.

The Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX) Rules mandate the timely disclosure of material developments. Whilst Paystack is not listed, the principle applies: stakeholders, including employees, investors, customers, and the broader tech ecosystem, have legitimate interests in understanding how the organisation responds to serious allegations.

Best practice typically means acknowledging the situation without premature conclusions about culpability; describing the process being followed to investigate and address the matter; committing to actions based on investigation findings; and providing regular updates, even if only to confirm that the process continues.

The African Corporate Governance Network advises that boards must avoid the instinct towards silence or obfuscation. In the age of social media and stakeholder activism, information voids are filled with speculation, often damaging the organisation more than controlled, honest communication would.

 

Looking Ahead: Rebuilding Trust After a Crisis

 

Assuming an investigation substantiates misconduct allegations, the board faces the challenging work of organisational recovery.

Swift accountability is paramount. Any disciplinary action must be proportionate, consistent with organisational policies and Nigerian employment law, and clearly communicated. Section 46(1) of the Labour Act prohibits ill-treatments and harassment of employee, and CAMA 2020 provides mechanisms for director removal. Half-measures that appear to protect powerful individuals destroy institutional credibility.

Systematic review becomes essential. The board should commission an examination of how misconduct occurred undetected and what systemic failures enabled it. The NCCG 2018 requires boards to “ensure effective evaluation of its performance.” This evaluation must extend to governance failures that allowed misconduct to occur or persist.

Policy enhancement follows naturally. Based on investigation findings, organisations must update harassment policies, reporting mechanisms, investigation protocols, and whistleblower protections. Each crisis represents an opportunity to strengthen governance infrastructure.

Cultural repair cannot be overlooked. Misconduct, and particularly how it’s handled, creates organisational trauma. This may require external facilitators, listening sessions, and visible commitment to cultural change from remaining leadership.

Long-term monitoring closes the circle. Following a misconduct crisis, boards should critically examine whether the current composition provides the independence and expertise needed for effective oversight. The CIoD Nigeria recommends regular board evaluations that assess not just skills and experience, but also independence and ethical leadership capacity.

 

Implications for Nigeria’s Tech Ecosystem

The Paystack situation carries particular weight given Nigeria’s position as one of Africa’s leading technology hubs. According to various industry reports, Nigeria attracts a large chunk of Africa’s startup funding. How this case is handled will signal to international investors whether Nigerian companies can self-regulate effectively or whether external governance oversight is needed.

The Central Bank of Nigeria’s recent fintech regulations include governance requirements specifically because the regulator recognised that technology-driven business models do not exempt companies from fundamental governance obligations. The Paystack case will likely accelerate regulatory scrutiny of governance in Nigerian fintech and tech companies more broadly.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria has also shown increasing interest in governance standards for unlisted companies that raise capital from the public or institutional investors. High-profile misconduct cases typically trigger regulatory reviews and potentially expanded requirements.

 

Lessons for the Broader Governance Community

The Paystack situation offers several transferable lessons for Nigerian and African companies. 

1. First, prepare well before a crisis strikes and never be caught unawares. Have investigation protocols in place , independent expert counsel relationships retained, and communication frameworks implemented BEFORE you need them. 
2. Second, founder status carries weight but provides no immunity. The individual who built the company is subject to the same behavioural standards as everyone else, arguably higher standards given their influence.
3. Third, speed matters. Delayed response compounds harm and signals institutional tolerance of misconduct. 
4. Fourth, independence is non-negotiable. Investigations must be led by those with no stake in protecting the accused. 
5. Fifth, regulatory compliance is the floor, not the ceiling. The NCCG 2018 and CAMA 2020 establish minimum standards; best practice requires proactive governance.
6. Sixth, context matters. Whilst learning from international best practices, Nigerian boards must apply governance principles within the specific context of Nigerian law, business culture, and stakeholder expectations. 
7. Seventh, ecosystem reputation is collective. High-profile governance failures affect investor confidence in the entire Nigerian tech ecosystem, not just the company involved.

 

Conclusion: The True Test of Governance

Sexual misconduct allegations against board members or senior leaders represents corporate governance’s litmus test moment. The structures, policies, and principles that look impressive in annual reports and compliance documents mean nothing if they cannot be activated when most needed.

As governance professionals practising in Nigeria and across Africa, we must be honest: and admit that TODAY, many boards will fail this test. They will prioritise protecting individuals over protecting the institution. They will delay, obfuscate, and hope the situation resolves itself. They will discover too late that their governance frameworks were aspirational rather than operational.

But some boards will rise to the moment. They will activate investigation protocols, support survivors, hold wrongdoers accountable, and emerge stronger for having demonstrated that their ethical commitments are real. These organisations will prove that Nigerian companies can hold themselves to the highest governance standards without external compulsion.

For Nigeria’s technology sector specifically, this moment is definitional. The world is watching to see whether one of Africa’s most celebrated success stories can demonstrate governance maturity. Paystack board’s response will either reinforce international confidence in Nigerian tech governance or confirm sceptics’ concerns that growth has outpaced institutional development.

The question for every board in Nigeria and across Africa is not whether you will face such a crisis; research suggests that most organisations eventually will, but whether you will be prepared to respond with the integrity and courage that governance responsibility demands.

In the end, effective corporate governance is not about preventing all misconduct though maintaining a zero toler; human fallibility makes that impossible. It’s about creating systems that detect problems early, respond decisively, and demonstrate to every stakeholder that no individual, regardless of their contributions, status, or equity stake, stands above the ethical standards upon which trust and sustainability depend.

The NCCG 2018 concludes with a powerful reminder: “Good corporate governance is not just good business practice; it is also a moral imperative.” For the sake of Nigeria’s reputation, its technology ecosystem, and most importantly the individuals harmed by misconduct, we must hope, and demand that boards choose conviction over convenience.

 

Billions Lost at the Ports: How Modernisation Can Turn Nigeria’s Fortune Around

Introduction

Nigeria’s ports are the gateways to its economy, handling over 80% of the nation’s International trade. Yet, for decades, inefficiency, congestion, and infrastructural decay have undermined their potential as regional trade hubs. The Apapa and Tin Can Island ports in Lagos, in particular, have long symbolised both the promise and the frustration of Nigeria’s maritime sector, vital yet overstressed.

However, recent modernisation initiatives signal a gradual but determined shift toward global best practices. The ongoing digitalisation of port operations, rehabilitation of facilities, and establishment of new deep-sea and inland dry ports reflect Nigeria’s commitment to improving port efficiency, competitiveness, and investor confidence.

The Challenges: Congestion, Infrastructure, and Bureaucracy

For years, Nigeria’s major seaports, especially Apapa and Tin Can Island, have battled systemic inefficiencies. Chronic congestion, caused by poor road access, limited terminal capacity, and manual documentation processes, has led to significant cargo dwell times and high operating costs for shippers. According to the African Centre for Supply Chain, Nigeria lost about US$14.2 billion annually to bottlenecks at seaports such as Apapa Port and Tin Can Island Port.¹ A 2020 report by Dynamar estimated losses of US$55 million per day from port congestion and related inefficiencies.² The Lagos Chamber of Commerce & Industry (LCCI) has estimated annual losses of around ₦2.5 trillion for businesses due to port and infrastructure inefficiencies.

A report also cites a figure of ₦7.6 trillion annually lost due to congestion at Apapa and Tin Can Island ports.⁴ Additionally, the multiplicity of government agencies at the ports, overlapping functions, and cumbersome inspection procedures have contributed to bureaucratic delays. This inefficiency has not only discouraged trade but has also driven up logistics costs, making Nigerian ports among the most expensive in West Africa.

Moreover, the lack of integration between seaports and hinterland logistics infrastructure, including rail and inland waterways, has further weakened supply chain connectivity and diverted trade to neighbouring ports in the Benin Republic, Ghana, and Togo.

The Modernisation Agenda: Digitalisation and Infrastructure Renewal

Recognising these challenges, the Federal Government, through the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) and Nigerian Shippers’ Council (NSC), has embarked on a comprehensive modernisation drive aimed at improving operational efficiency and transparency.

• Digitalisation of Port Operations:

The introduction of the electronic call-up system for trucks at Apapa helped ease road congestion, while the gradual transition to Port Community Systems (PCS) and Single Window digital platforms harmonised documentation, reduced human contact, and minimised corruption and administrative delays.

• Infrastructure Rehabilitation:

Major rehabilitation works were carried out at the Apapa, Tin Can Island, and Onne Ports, including quay strengthening, channel dredging, and berth expansion. These upgrades improved capacity for larger vessels and significantly reduced turnaround times.

• Development of Deep-Sea Ports:

The completion and commissioning of the Lekki Deep Sea Port, Nigeria’s first fully automated and privately financed deep-water port, marked a major milestone. With its 16.5-meter draft and advanced cargo-handling technology, Lekki Port decongested Lagos’ traditional ports and repositioned Nigeria as a leading maritime hub in West and Central Africa.

• Inland Dry Ports and Multimodal Integration:

Projects such as the Funtua, Dala, and Ibadan Dry Ports were developed to extend port services to the hinterland. These facilities promoted multimodal logistics, reduced transportation costs, and enhanced regional trade by integrating sea, rail, and road networks.

The Role of Policy and Private Sector Collaboration

Effective port modernisation extends beyond infrastructure; it depends on policy coherence, institutional reforms, and private sector participation. The concessioning of port terminals to private operators under the Landlord Port Model has improved efficiency in some terminals, demonstrating the value of public–private partnerships (PPPs).

Moreover, the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) and other agencies must continue to align with the modernisation agenda through automation of clearance processes and coordinated inspections. The introduction of the Port Process Manual by the Shippers’ Council is a commendable step toward standardising procedures and ensuring accountability.

Economic Impact and Regional Competitiveness

A modern and efficient port system directly impacts Nigeria’s economic performance. Reduced cargo dwell time, faster clearance processes, and lower logistics costs enhance trade facilitation, attract foreign investment, and improve Nigeria’s ranking in the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI).

With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in full implementation, efficient ports will be central to Nigeria’s ability to compete as a manufacturing and export hub in the region. The development of deep-sea and dry ports will not only expand trade corridors but also stimulate industrial clusters and job creation in port cities and inland regions.

Conclusion

Port modernisation is no longer optional; it is imperative for Nigeria’s economic growth and trade competitiveness. While challenges remain in governance, enforcement, and infrastructure financing, the progress recorded through digitalisation, concessioning, and new port developments is encouraging. More action is expected.

Sustained investment, policy consistency, and institutional discipline will be key to ensuring that Nigeria’s ports evolve from bottlenecks into efficient trade gateways. If properly managed, the modernisation of ports such as Apapa, Tin Can Island, and Lekki Deep Sea Port will mark the beginning of a new era of maritime efficiency and regional dominance for Nigeria.

 

REFERENCES

[1]

https://guardian.ng/business-services/maritime/how-nigeria-loses-14-2bn-to-bottlenecks-at-ports/ accessed 1st October, 2025.

[2]

https://guardian.ng/business-services/nigeria-loses-55-million-daily-to-port-congestion/ accessed 1st October, 2025

[3]

https://guardian.ng/business-services/industry/businesses-lose-n2-5tr-to-port-infrastructure-inefficiency accessed 1st October, 2025.

[4]

https://punchng.com/port-monopoly-a-threat-to-nigerias-economic-growth/ accessed 1st October, 2025.